and keep all
I have said from having its effect; so I judge it best to add a few
more words.

In the first place, in spite of all my explanations, the word 'chance'
will still be giving trouble. Though you may yourselves be adverse to
the deterministic doctrine, you wish a pleasanter word than 'chance' to
name the opposite doctrine by; and you very likely consider my
preference for such a word a perverse sort of a partiality on my part.
It certainly _is_ a bad word to make converts with; and you wish I had
not thrust it so butt-foremost at you,--you wish to use a milder term.

Well, I admit there may be just a dash of perversity in its choice.
The spectacle of the mere word-grabbing game played by the soft
determinists has perhaps driven me too violently the other way; and,
rather than be found wrangling with them for the good words, I am
willing to take the first bad one which comes along, provided it be
unequivocal. The question is of things, not of eulogistic names for
them; and the best word is the one that enables men to {180} know the
quickest whether they disagree or not about the things. But the word
'chance,' with its singular negativity, is just the word for this
purpose. Whoever uses it instead of 'freedom,' squarely and resolutely
gives up all pretence to control the things he says are free. For
_him_, he confesses that they are no better than mere chance would be.
It is a word of _impotence_, and is therefore the only sincere word we
can use, if, in granting freedom to certain things, we grant it
honestly, and really risk the game. "Who chooses me must give and
forfeit all he hath." Any other word permits of quibbling, and lets
us, after the fashion of the soft determinists, make a pretence of
restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, while with the other
we anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get
beyond our sight.

But now you will bring up your final doubt. Does not the admission of
such an unguaranteed chance or freedom preclude utterly the notion of a
Providence governing the world? Does it not leave the fate of the
universe at the mercy of the chance-possibilities, and so far insecure?
Does it not, in short, deny the craving of our nature for an ultimate
peace behind all tempests, for a blue zenith above all clouds?

To this my answer must be very brief. The belief in free-will is not
in the least incompatible with the belief in Providence, provided you