itude of
'subjective' opinions, can be found.

But this is the kind of world with which the philosopher, so long as he
holds to the hope of a philosophy, will not put up. Among the various
ideals represented, there must be, he thinks, some which have the more
truth or authority; and to these the others _ought_ to yield, so that
system and subordination may reign. Here in the word 'ought' the
notion of _obligation_ comes emphatically into view, and the next thing
in order must be to make its meaning clear.

Since the outcome of the discussion so far has been to show us that
nothing can be good or right except {193} so far as some consciousness
feels it to be good or thinks it to be right, we perceive on the very
threshold that the real superiority and authority which are postulated
by the philosopher to reside in some of the opinions, and the really
inferior character which he supposes must belong to others, cannot be
explained by any abstract moral 'nature of things' existing
antecedently to the concrete thinkers themselves with their ideals.
Like the positive attributes good and bad, the comparative ones better
and worse must be _realised_ in order to be real. If one ideal
judgment be objectively better than another, that betterness must be
made flesh by being lodged concretely in some one's actual perception.
It cannot float in the atmosphere, for it is not a sort of
meteorological phenomenon, like the aurora borealis or the zodiacal
light. Its _esse_ is _percipi_, like the _esse_ of the ideals
themselves between which it obtains. The philosopher, therefore, who
seeks to know which ideal ought to have supreme weight and which one
ought to be subordinated, must trace the _ought_ itself to the _de
facto_ constitution of some existing consciousness, behind which, as
one of the data of the universe, he as a purely ethical philosopher is
unable to go. This consciousness must make the one ideal right by
feeling it to be right, the other wrong by feeling it to be wrong. But
now what particular consciousness in the universe _can_ enjoy this
prerogative of obliging others to conform to a rule which it lays down?

If one of the thinkers were obviously divine, while all the rest were
human, there would probably be no practical dispute about the matter.
The divine thought would be the model, to which the others should
conform. But still the theoretic question {194} would remain, What is
the ground of the obligation,