se marks and measures of goodness seems to be
the capacity to bring happiness. But in order not to break down
fatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses
that never _aim_ at happiness; so that, after all, in seeking for a
universal principle we inevitably are carried onward to the most
universal principle,--that _the essence of good is simply to satisfy
demand_. The demand may be for anything under the sun. There is
really no more ground for supposing that all our demands can be
accounted for by one universal underlying kind of motive than there is
ground for supposing that all physical phenomena are cases of a single
law. The elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those
of physics are. The various ideals have no common character apart from
the fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can be so
used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically
accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale.

A look at another peculiarity of the ethical universe, as we find it,
will still further show us the philosopher's perplexities. As a purely
theoretic problem, namely, the casuistic question would hardly ever
come up at all. If the ethical philosopher were only asking after the
best _imaginable_ system of goods he would indeed have an easy task;
for all demands as {202} such are _prima facie_ respectable, and the
best simply imaginary world would be one in which _every_ demand was
gratified as soon as made. Such a world would, however, have to have a
physical constitution entirely different from that of the one which we
inhabit. It would need not only a space, but a time, 'of
_n_-dimensions,' to include all the acts and experiences incompatible
with one another here below, which would then go on in
conjunction,--such as spending our money, yet growing rich; taking our
holiday, yet getting ahead with our work; shooting and fishing, yet
doing no hurt to the beasts; gaining no end of experience, yet keeping
our youthful freshness of heart; and the like. There can be no
question that such a system of things, however brought about, would be
the absolutely ideal system; and that if a philosopher could create
universes _a priori_, and provide all the mechanical conditions, that
is the sort of universe which he should unhesitatingly create.

But this world of ours is made on an entirely different pattern, and
the casuistic question here is most tragicall