s elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an
extravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make the
will independent of reason.
192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the
infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect
conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. This
objection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through its
distinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinct
ideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when it
comes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. Besides, M.
Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for
seeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning are in God in a
transcendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in his
understanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an order and a
_priority of nature_, whereas with us there is a _priority of time_. It is
therefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one
stroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be said
that he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition. On the contrary, it
is because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also
perfect.
193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of the
rules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one
should have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a
truth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprising
that there should be people who believe that God only half observes these
rules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to
recognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that
God could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famous
Alfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by [248]
certain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his
name. This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world
had consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently the
Ptolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. He
believed therefore that something better planned could have been made, and
he was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with the
discoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledg
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