was held in 1832, in Kerper _v._ Hoch (1 Watts, 9),
that the period named was a limitation not of the lien but of the debt
itself, and available in favor of heirs and devisees, volunteers under
the debtor and succeeding to his rights _cum onere_. As we have seen,
but two cases are to be produced of litigation arising out of this law
carried to the highest tribunal from 1794 to 1832. More than twenty
cases are to be found reported since, in which that court has been
called upon to draw distinctions and settle the precise extent of their
own law. Thus a little complicated system has grown up on this
construction of the act. A volume, indeed, might be written on Kerper
_v._ Hoch and its satellites, when if the act had been let alone to
speak for itself, and the prior decision followed, it would have been a
simple and intelligible rule of action, until the legislature saw fit
to alter it. It seems that this consideration pressed upon at least one
of the judges, who joined in that decision; for in a subsequent case,
when Kerper _v._ Hoch was cited, that Judge, with characteristic candor,
interrupted the counsel with the remark: "We will abide by the rule, but
it was erroneously decided." (Hocker's Appeal, 4 Barr, 498.)
This, then, is the legitimate province of Jurisprudence, _Stare super
antiquas vias_, to maintain the ancient landmarks, to respect authority,
to guard the integrity of the law as a science, that it may be a certain
rule of decision, and promote that security of life, liberty, and
property, which, as we have seen, is the great end of human society and
government. Thus industry will receive its best encouragement; thus
enterprise will be most surely stimulated; thus constant additions to
capital by savings will be promoted; thus the living will be content in
the feeling that their earnings are safely invested; and the dying be
consoled with the reflection that the widow and orphan are left under
the care and protection of a government, which administers impartial
justice according to established laws.
With jurisprudence, lawyers have the most, nay all, to do. The opinion
of the Bar will make itself heard and respected on the Bench. With sound
views, their influence for good in this respect may well be said to be
incalculable. It is indeed the noblest faculty of the profession to
counsel the ignorant, defend the weak and oppressed, and to stand forth
on all occasions as the bulwark of private rights against th
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