unsel should set their faces against all undue influences of
the sort; they are unfaithful to the court, if they allow any improper
means of the kind to be resorted to. _Judicem nec de obtinendo jure
orari oportet nec de injuria exorari._ It may be in place to remark here
that the counsel in a cause ought to avoid all unnecessary communication
with the jurors before or during any trial in which he may be
concerned. He should enforce the same duty upon his client. Any attempt
by an attorney to influence a juror by arguments or otherwise, will, of
course, if discovered and brought to the notice of the court, lead to
expulsion or suspension from the Bar, according to the degree and
quality of the offence. The freedom of the jury-box from extraneous
influences is a matter of such vital moment in our system that the
courts are bound to watch over it with jealous eyes. "It would be an
injury to the administration of justice," says C. J. Tilghman, "not to
declare that it is gross misbehavior for any person to speak with a
juror, or for a juror to permit any person to speak with him, respecting
the cause he is trying, at any time after he is summoned and before the
verdict is delivered." "The words thus uttered," says Judge Hare, "by
one of the best men and purest magistrates that ever filled the judicial
office, must find an echo in every bosom. The principle which dictated
them does not require the aid of argument or elucidation; it is native
to the conscience, and will be apparent to all who consult the monitor
in their own breast. The wrong is aggravated when the taint of personal
interest mingles with it, as when committed by a party to the cause, but
appears in the worst form when it is the act of attorneys or counsel,
who are the sworn officers of the court, whose duty it is to act as
guardians of the fountains of justice, and who are false to their charge
when they defile or taint those waters, which they are pledged to keep
pure and unpolluted. Such conduct in counsel is a gross breach of trust,
for which a removal from the trust is but an inadequate punishment."[6]

There is another duty to the court, and that is, to support and maintain
it in its proper province wherever it comes in conflict with the
co-ordinate tribunal--the jury. The limits of these two provinces are
settled with great accuracy; and even if a judge makes a mistake, the
only proper place to correct his error is in the superior tribunal,--the
Court of