s professional
assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible,
usurps the functions of both judge and jury.

As an answer to any sweeping objection made to the profession in
general, the view thus presented may be quite satisfactory. It by no
means follows, however, as a principle of private action for the
advocate, that all causes are to be taken by him indiscriminately and
conducted with a view to one single end, _success_. It is much to be
feared, however, that the prevailing tone of professional ethics leads
practically to this result. He has an undoubted right to refuse a
retainer, and decline to be concerned in any cause, at his discretion.
It is a discretion to be wisely and justly exercised. When he has once
embarked in a case, he cannot retire from it without the consent of his
client or the approbation of the court.[10] To come before the court
with a revelation of facts, damning to his client's case, as a ground
for retiring from it, would be a plain breach of the confidence reposed
in him, and the law would seal his lips.[11] How then is he to acquit
himself? Lord Brougham, in his justly celebrated defence of the Queen,
went to very extravagant lengths upon this subject; no doubt he was led
by the excitement of so great an occasion to say what cool reflection
and sober reason certainly never can approve. "An advocate," said he,
"in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among
them to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction he may
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences; though it should be
his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion."

On the other hand, and as illustrative of the practical difficulty,
which this question presented to a man, with as nice a perception of
moral duty as perhaps ever lived, it is said by Bishop Burnet, of Sir
Matthew Hale: "If he saw a cause was unjust, he for a great while would
not meddle further in it, but to give his advice that _it was so_; if
the parties after that would go on, they were to seek another
counsellor, for he would assist none in acts of injustice; if he found
the cause doubtful or weak in point of law, he always a