use, contrary
to the fact. Indeed, the occasions are very rare in which he ought to
throw the weight of his own private opinion into the scales in favor of
the side he has espoused. If that opinion has been formed on a statement
of facts not in evidence, it ought not to be heard,--it would be illegal
and improper in the tribunal to allow any force whatever to it; if on
the evidence only, it is enough to show from that the legal and moral
grounds on which such opinion rests. Some very sound and judicious
observations have been made by Mr. Whewell in a recent work on the
Elements of Moral and Political Science, which deserve to be quoted at
length;--

"Some moralists," says he, "have ranked with the cases in which
convention supersedes the general rule of truth, an advocate asserting
the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his client's cause. Those
who contend for such indulgence argue that the profession is an
instrument for the administration of justice: he is to do all he can for
his client: the application of laws is a matter of great complexity and
difficulty: that the right administration of them in doubtful cases is
best provided for if the arguments on each side are urged with the
utmost force. The advocate is not the judge.

"This may be all well, if the advocate let it be so understood. But if
in pleading he assert his belief that his cause is just when he believes
it unjust, he offends against truth, as any other man would do who in
like manner made a like assertion.

"Every man, when he advocates a case in which morality is concerned, has
an influence upon his hearers, which arises from the belief that he
shares the moral sentiments of all mankind. This influence of his
supposed morality is one of his possessions, which, like all his
possessions, he is bound to use for moral ends. If he mix up his
character as an advocate with his character as a moral agent, using his
moral influence for the advocate's purpose, he acts immorally. He makes
the moral rule subordinate to the professional rule. He sells to his
client not only his skill and learning, but himself. He makes it the
supreme object of his life to be not a good man, but a successful
lawyer.

"There belong to him, moreover, moral ends which regard his profession;
namely, to make it an institution fitted to promote morality. To raise
and purify the character of the profession, so that it may answer the
ends of justice without requiring insinceri