would not have been justified in
withdrawing from the case: he was still bound to defend the accused upon
the evidence; though a knowledge of his guilt, from whatever source
derived, might and ought materially to influence the mode of the
defence. No right-minded man, professional or otherwise, will contend
that it would have been right in him to have lent himself to a defence,
which might have ended, had it been successful, in bringing down an
unjust suspicion upon an innocent person; or even to stand up and
falsely pretend a confidence in the truth and justice of his cause,
which he did not feel. But there were those on this side of the
Atlantic, who demurred to the conclusion, that an advocate is under a
moral obligation to maintain the defence of a man who has admitted to
him his guilt. Men have been known, however, under the influence of some
delusion, to confess themselves guilty of crimes which they had not
committed: and hence, to decline acting as counsel in such a case, is a
dangerous refinement in morals.[21] Nothing seems plainer than the
proposition, that a person accused of a crime is to be tried and
convicted, if convicted at all, _upon evidence_, and _whether guilty or
not guilty_, if the evidence is insufficient to convict him, he has _a
legal right_ to be acquitted. The tribunal that convicts without
sufficient evidence may decide according to the fact; but the next jury,
acting on the same principle, may condemn an innocent man. If this be
so, is not the prisoner in every case entitled to have the evidence
carefully sifted, the weak points of the prosecution exposed, the
reasonable doubts presented which should weigh in his favor? And what
offence to truth or morality does his advocate commit in discharging
that duty to the best of his learning and ability? What apology can he
make for throwing up his brief? The truth he cannot disclose; the law
seals his lips as to what has thus been communicated to him in
confidence by his client. He has no alternative, then, but to perform
his duty. It is his duty, however, as an advocate merely, as Baron Parke
has well expressed it, to use ALL FAIR ARGUMENTS ARISING ON THE
EVIDENCE. Beyond that, he is not bound to go in any case; in a case in
which he is satisfied in his own mind of the guilt of the accused, he is
not justified in going.

Under all circumstances, the utmost candor should be used towards the
client. This is imperatively demanded alike by considerat