e to matters beyond the
power of the Irish Legislature, or, being enacted by Parliament after
the passing of this Act, may be expressly extended to Ireland."

It will be noticed that the words "beyond the power of the Irish
Legislature" referred to the subjects expressly excepted in the Bill
itself. This is one of the points in which the Irish Constitution will
bear at any rate a superficial resemblance to that of a Province or
State within a Federation rather than to that of a self-governing
Colony. The practice of expressly, and in the text of a Constitution,
forbidding a self-governing Colony to legislate upon certain subjects,
or of expressly reserving concurrent or exclusive powers of legislation
to the Mother Country, has fallen into disuse since the establishment of
the principle of responsible government. Such restrictions were inserted
in the Canadian Union Act of 1840, where the old right of the Mother
Country to impose customs duties in the Colonies for the regulation of
commerce was reaffirmed, and even in the Acts of 1855 for giving full
powers of self-government to the Australian Colonies, which were
forbidden to impose intercolonial customs, though they were expressly
granted the power of imposing any other customs duties they pleased,[91]
but they do not appear in modern Constitutions, for example in the
Transvaal Constitution of 1906. As I have indicated, this implies no
change in the strict legal theory of Colonial subordination to the
Mother Country; for, although the tendency of modern juristic thought is
to ascribe "plenary" power to a Colony, restrictions nevertheless do
exist in practice, and are contained, express or implicit, in a number
of disjointed Acts.

A Federating Colony, on the other hand, like a foreign Federation, has
in its own self-made, domestic Constitution to apportion powers with
some approach to precision between the federal and the provincial
authorities, and in this respect the Irish Bill, in reserving certain
powers to the Imperial Parliament, will resemble a federating Bill, and
it should follow the American and Australian precedents in leaving
residuary powers to the subordinate or Irish Legislature, not, in
accordance with the Canadian precedent, to the Parliament at
Westminster. That is an indispensable corollary of excluding Irish
Members from Westminster.

In speaking of powers reserved or delegated, and of residuary or
unallocated powers, I have thus far referred on