generally caused most of
the practical difficulties met with in arranging the Federation both of
Canada and Australia, and in their subsequent domestic relations. Nova
Scotia in the former case, and Western Australia in the latter, held out
to the last instant, and the former subsequently had to receive
exceptionally favourable treatment. In both Federations some measure of
friction is chronic, and in neither has a perfectly satisfactory system
been evolved. The Union of Ireland and Great Britain in 1800 was in this
respect, as in all others, a flagrant departure from sound principle.
The Customs Union which followed it was a forced Customs Union, and,
together with the other financial arrangements between the two
countries, has produced results incredibly absurd and mischievous. Some
of these results I briefly indicated in Chapter V. In the following
chapters I shall tell the whole story fully, and I hope to convince the
reader that we should follow, not only historically, but morally and
practically, the correct line of action if, in dissolving the
Legislative Union, we dissolve the Customs Union also. That would
involve a virtually independent system of finance for Ireland, and place
her fiscally in the position of a self-governing Colony. If and when a
real Federation of the United Kingdom becomes practical politics, she
would then have the choice of entering it in the spirit and on the terms
invariably associated with all true Federations or Unions. That is, she
would voluntarily relinquish, in her own interest, financial and other
rights to a central Government solely concerned with central affairs.

I need scarcely point out in this connection the vital importance of the
question of representation at Westminster. Ireland resembles the
self-governing Colonies, and differs from Great Britain, in that the
greater part of the revenue raised from her inhabitants is derived from
Customs and Excise--that is, from the indirect taxation of commodities
of common use. If she is denied control of these sources of revenue
under the coming Bill, it will be absolutely necessary, in spite of all
the concomitant difficulties, to give her a representation at
Westminster which is as effective as it can be made. But let it be
realized that we could not make her control over her own finance as
effective as that exercised by a small State within a Federation,
because such a State, however small, has equal, or at any rate
disproportio