re of
his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had
engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He
soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made
a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded
in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the
latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some
distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.
I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his
support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was
ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was
notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to
come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our
extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in
getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never
at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night
before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last
assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do
anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the
army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas
were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him
orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,
when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,
holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements
in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an
order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and
beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be
done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the
very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the
morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but
still thought that the Army of the Potomac had