e people too; that one or
the other must quit, and we could not until the army of Jos. Johnston
was conquered, etc., etc. Mr. Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and I
advised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Kentucky, and
to haul out their supplies by the wagon-road from the same quarter,
by way of Cumberland Gap. By these changes we nearly or quite
doubled our daily accumulation of stores at the front, and yet even
this was not found enough.

I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of
transportation, Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster, General
J. L. Donaldson, and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith,
for conference. I assumed the strength of the army to move from
Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the
number of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, at
thirty-five thousand; then, allowing for occasional wrecks of
trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the
road itself by guerrillas and regular raids, we estimated it would
require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach
Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply.
Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward
hay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds of oats or
corn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the question
of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn
fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at
that season of the year. The problem then was to deliver at
Chattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily,
leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on the hoof, and all the
troops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinary
roads. Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess
cars or locomotives enough to do this work. I then instructed and
authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville
from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured
enough to fill the requirements of our problem. At the time he
only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred
cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all
contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one
thousand cars. As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the President of the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were holding on
to all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestly
remonstr