ERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia.
GENERAL: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 8.30
P. M. of yesterday.
You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is
in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army
in check should he abandon Dalton. He cannot afford to abandon
Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he
observes that we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit. He
cannot afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army
will not admit of it.
Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threaten
the safety of the railroad all the time. But, to tell the truth, I
would rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he
may find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an open
field. At all events, we can then choose our own ground, and he
will be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend to put a
column into Buzzard-Roost Gap at present.
See that you are in easy communication with me and with all
head-quarters. After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold.
Yours,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864-Evening
Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia
GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton.
In that event, Howard's corps and the cavalry will pursue; all the
rest will follow your route. I will be down early in the morning.
Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road.
Hooker must be with you now, and you may send General Garrard by
Summerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all the
lines to be felt at once.
W. T. SHERMAN, major-general commanding.
McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had
not done the full measure of his work. He had in hand twenty-three
thousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked into
Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed
his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have
easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the
knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels. Had he done
so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attack
him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place,
and
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