stitution requires the suppression of the foreign slave trade, but
does not require the prohibition of slavery in the Territories. That is a
mistake in point of fact. The Constitution does not require the action of
Congress in either case, and it does authorize it in both. And so there is
still no difference between the cases.

In regard to what I have said of the advantage the slave States have over
the free in the matter of representation, the Judge replied that we in
the free States count five free negroes as five white people, while in
the slave States they count five slaves as three whites only; and that the
advantage, at last, was on the side of the free States.

Now, in the slave States they count free negroes just as we do; and it so
happens that, besides their slaves, they have as many free negroes as we
have, and thirty thousand over. Thus, their free negroes more than balance
ours; and their advantage over us, in consequence of their slaves, still
remains as I stated it.

In reply to my argument that the compromise measures of 1850 were a system
of equivalents, and that the provisions of no one of them could fairly
be carried to other subjects without its corresponding equivalent being
carried with it, the Judge denied outright that these measures had any
connection with or dependence upon each other. This is mere desperation.
If they had no connection, why are they always spoken of in connection?
Why has he so spoken of them a thousand times? Why has he constantly
called them a series of measures? Why does everybody call them a
compromise? Why was California kept out of the Union six or seven months,
if it was not because of its connection with the other measures? Webster's
leading definition of the verb "to compromise" is "to adjust and settle
a difference, by mutual agreement, with concessions of claims by the
parties." This conveys precisely the popular understanding of the word
"compromise."

We knew, before the Judge told us, that these measures passed separately,
and in distinct bills, and that no two of them were passed by the votes of
precisely the same members. But we also know, and so does he know, that
no one of them could have passed both branches of Congress but for the
understanding that the others were to pass also. Upon this understanding,
each got votes which it could have got in no other way. It is this fact
which gives to the measures their true character; and it is the universal
knowle