anscends this
difference in one way or another, whether by combining the two under a
higher notion, or, as it would be more natural to expect on Cartesian
principles, by abstracting equally from the particular characteristics
of both. Descartes really does neither, or rather he acts partly on
the one principle and partly on the other. In his idea of God he
abstracts from the properties of matter but not from those of mind.
"God," he says, "contains in himself _formaliter_ all that is in mind,
but only _eminenter_ all that is in matter";[8] or, as he elsewhere
expresses it more popularly, he _is_ mind, but he is only the creator
of matter. And for this he gives as his reason, that matter as being
divisible and passive is essentially imperfect. _Ipsa natura corporis
multas imperfectiones involvit_, and, therefore, "there is more
analogy between sounds and colours than there is between material
things and God." But the real imperfection here lies in the
abstractness of the Cartesian conception of matter as merely extended,
merely passive; and this is balanced by the equal abstractness of the
conception of mind or self-consciousness as an absolutely simple
activity, a pure intelligence without any object but itself. If matter
as absolutely opposed to mind is imperfect, mind as absolutely opposed
to matter is equally imperfect. In fact they are the elements or
factors of a unity, and lose all meaning when severed from each other,
and if we are to seek this unity by abstraction, we must equally
abstract from both.

Reason and will.

The result of this one-sidedness is seen in the fact that Descartes,
who begins by separating mind from matter, ends by finding the essence
of mind in pure will, i.e. in pure formal self-determination. Hence
God's will is conceived as absolutely arbitrary, not determined by any
end or law, for all laws, even the necessary truths that constitute
reason, spring from God's determination, and do not precede it. "He is
the author of the essence of things no less than their existence," and
his will has no reason but his will. In man there is an intelligence
with eternal laws or truths involved in its structure, which so far
limits his will. "He finds the nature of good and truth already
determined by God, and his will cannot be moved by anything else." His
highest freedom consists in having his will determined by a clear
per