being, we must still ask what kind of unity? Is it a mere
generic unity, reached by abstraction, and therefore leaving out all
the distinguishing characteristics of the particulars under it? Or is
it a concrete unity to which the particular elements are subordinated,
but in which they are nevertheless included? To answer this question,
we need only look at the relation of the finite to the infinite, as it
is expressed in that passage already quoted, and in many others.
Descartes always speaks of the infinite as a purely affirmative or
positive existence, and of the finite in so far as it is distinguished
from the infinite, as purely negative, or in other words as a
nonentity. "I am," he says, "a mean between God and nothing, between
the Supreme Being and not-being. In so far as I am created by God,
there is nothing in me that can deceive me or lead me into error. But
on the other hand, if I consider myself as participating in
nothingness or not-being, inasmuch as I am not myself the Supreme
Being, but in many ways defective, I find myself exposed to an
infinity of errors. Thus error as such is not something real that
depends on God, but simply a defect; I do not need to explain it by
means of any special faculty bestowed on me by God, but merely by the
fact that the faculty for discerning truth from error with which he
has endowed me, is not infinite."[6] But if we follow out this
principle to its logical result, we must say not only that error is a
consequence of finitude, but also that the very _existence_ of the
finite as such is an error or illusion. All finitude, all
determination, according to the well-known Spinozistic aphorism, is
negation, and negation cannot constitute reality. To know the reality
of things, therefore, we have to abstract from their limits, or in
other words, the only reality is the infinite. Finite being, _qua_
finite, has no existence, and finite self-consciousness, consciousness
of a self in opposition to or limited by a not-self, is an illusion.
But Descartes does not thus reason. He does not see "anything in the
nature of the infinite which should exclude the existence of finite
things." "What," he asks, "would become of the power of that imaginary
infinite if it could create nothing? Perceiving in ourselves the power
of thinking, we can easily conceive that there should be a greater
intelligence elsewhere. And even if we