ts which would
make it difficult or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to
obtain afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually in view.
Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece and Rumania in the War
would, by bringing about the defeat of Austria, secure the realization of
Greek, Rumanian and Servian aspirations. To render such participation
effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured that, if
Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were realized, she would obtain
satisfactory compensations in Macedonia, on condition that she came in or
at least maintained a not malevolent neutrality. But the question of
compensations affected chiefly Servia: all he asked of M. Venizelos on
that point was not to oppose any concessions that Servia might be
inclined to make to Bulgaria.
Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal or was merely
in the nature of a suggestion is hard to determine. But M. Venizelos
seems to have understood it in the latter sense, for in speaking of it he
made use of the very informal adjective "absurd." No one, indeed, could
seriously believe that Bulgaria would be induced to co-operate, or even
to remain neutral, by the hypothetical and partial promises which Sir
Edward Grey indicated; and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her
flank Greece could not march to Servia's aid. So M. Venizelos, under the
impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work, and within a few
hours produced a scheme calculated to correct the "absurdity" of the
British notion, to earn the gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an
Asiatic Empire for his country. It was nothing less than a complete
reversal of his former attitude: that Greece should not only withdraw her
opposition to concessions on the part of Servia, but should voluntarily
sacrifice Cavalla to the Bulgars, provided they joined the Allies
forthwith. This scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he
submitted to the King.
M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the cession of Cavalla
would be, and therefore he had to use very strong arguments to commend it
to his Majesty. In the {24} first place, he emphasized the imperative
need of helping Servia, since, should Servia be crushed, the
Austro-German armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or Bulgaria
might be invited to take possession of Servian Macedonia, in which case
Greece would have either to let the Balkan balance o
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