n Baring could have done little
or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could
have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in
Cairo. Mehemet Ali was said to have appointed as _mudir_ or governor in
a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, "But how
am I to govern these people?" "Listen," replied the pasha; "buy the
biggest and heaviest _kurbash_ you can find; hang it up in the centre of
the _mudirieh_, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require
to use it." The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn's _kurbash_;
it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple
presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one
other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position
towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished
by a khedivial decree of 18th January 1883, and replaced by an English
financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to
co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not
reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of
reorganization was declined. But though Dual Control was at an end, the
Caisse de la Dette remained, and this body was to prove a constant clog
on the financial measures of the Egyptian government.

The Policy of evacuation.

At first the intention of the British government was simply to restore
the power of the khedive, to keep his highness for some time in the
right path by friendly advice, and to withdraw the British troops as
soon as possible. As Lord Granville explained in a circular to the
powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her "the duty of
giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be
established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the
elements of stability and progress." But there was to be no embarking on
a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the
responsibilities of the protecting power and necessitate the indefinite
prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the
British government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a _politique
de replatrage_. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr
Gladstone's cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to
conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders
now to advance and now to retrea