. When we come
to a different application of his principles, we find him taking a
curiously balanced position between different schools. 'Common sense'
naturally wishes to adapt itself to generally accepted beliefs; and with
so flexible a doctrine as that of 'intuitions' it is not difficult to
discover methods of proving the ordinary dogmas. Stewart's theology is
characteristic of this tendency. He describes the so-called _a priori_
proof, as formulated by Clarke. But without denying its force, he does
not like to lay stress upon it. He dreads 'ontology' too much. He
therefore considers that the argument at once most satisfactory to the
philosopher and most convincing to ordinary men is the argument from
design. The belief in God is not 'intuitive,' but follows immediately
from two first principles: the principle that whatever exists has a
cause, and the principle that a 'combination of means implies a
designer.'[185] The belief in a cause arises on our perception of change
as our belief in the external world arises upon our sensations. The
belief in design must be a 'first principle' because it includes a
belief in 'necessity' which cannot arise from mere observation of
'contingent truths.'[186] Hence Stewart accepts the theory of final
causes as stated by Paley. Though Paley's ethics offended him, he has
nothing but praise for the work upon _Natural Theology_.[187] Thus,
although 'common sense' does not enable us to lay down the central
doctrine of theology as a primary truth, it does enable us to interpret
experience in theological terms. In other words, his theology is of the
purely empirical kind, which was, as we shall see, the general
characteristic of the time.

In Stewart's discussion of ethical problems the same doctrine of 'final
causes' assumes a special importance. Stewart, as elsewhere, tries to
hold an intermediate position; to maintain the independence of morality
without committing himself to the 'ontological' or purely logical view;
and to show that virtue conduces to happiness without allowing that its
dictates are to be deduced from its tendency to produce happiness. His
doctrine is to a great extent derived from the teaching of Hutcheson and
Bishop Butler. He really approximates most closely to Hutcheson, who
takes a similar view of Utilitarianism, but he professes the warmest
admiration of Butler. He explicitly accepts Butler's doctrine of the
'supremacy of the conscience'--a doctrine which as he s