rm themselves. Still I should be wrong
if I did not express my concern at the want of energy and push displayed
by the 11th Division. It cannot all be want of experience as 13th have
shown dash and self-confidence. Turks were almost negligible yesterday
once you got ashore. To-day there was nothing to stop determined
commanders leading such fine men as yours. Tell me what is wrong with
the 11th Division. Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both?
I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once and can also supply
two competent Brigadiers. You must get a move on or the whole plan of
operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't secure the AJA
LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without delay the enemy will. You must use your
personal influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action against
the weak forces of the Turks in your front, and while agreeing to the
capture of W Hills and spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day,
it is of vital importance to the whole operation that you thereafter
promptly take steps to secure the ridge without possession of which
SUVLA BAY is not safe. You must face casualties and strike while the
opportunity offers and remember the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your
principal and dominant objective and it must be captured. Every day's
delay in its capture will enormously multiply your casualties. I want
the name of the Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was
retiring owing to a strong attack and then subsequently reported that
the attack in question has never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as he
may be able to help you on your right flank."
[Illustration: LIEUT. GEN SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. _"Elliott
and Fry phot."_]
This message seemed so important that it was sent by hand of
Hore-Ruthven and another Officer by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells
me that, when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day he showed General
Stopford the last two paragraphs of this memo which I had written when
toning down the wording of a General Staff draft:--
* * * * *
"C.G.S.
"(1) I do not think much good rubbing it into these fellows, there are
very few Turks opposed to them. We have done it, and that was right, but
we must not overdo it.
"(2) But the men ought to be made to understand that really the whole
result of this campaign may depend on their quickly getting a footing on
the hills right and left of Anafarta. Officers an
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