otal rifles, owing to casualties,
under 30,000. The Suvla losses have been too severe considering extent
and nature of the fighting that has taken place, and can only be
attributed to the inexperience of the troops and their leaders, and the
daring way in which the enemy skirmishers presumed upon it in the broken
and wooded country. Birdwood has lost about 13,000 since the action
began, and has now available some 25,000 rifles. The VIIIth Corps has
23,000 rifles, and the French 17,000 rifles.

"The Turks have continued to be most active in the South, no doubt with
the object of preventing us moving troops, but apparently they have now
no more than 35,000 in this zone. The majority of the enemy Commander's
troops are against Anzac and in reserve in the valley between Hills 305
and 261, his strategic flank.

"In the Northern zone, in the fighting line at Suvla and Anzac and in
reserve he may now have in all 75,000, and can either reinforce Hill 305
or issue through the gap between the two Anafartas to oppose any attack
on Ismail Oglu Tepe or on the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. He
has guns on Hill 305, on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and on the ridge North of
Anafarta Sagir from which he can shell landing places at Suvla Bay, but
is not holding the latter ridge in strength, nor do I think he has
enough troops to enable him to do so.

"The position regarding the Turkish reinforcements from Keshan is not
clear. Only small parties have been located by aeroplanes marching
South, and it appears that either this information was incorrect or that
the enemy's forces had already got as far as the peninsula before
fighting began.

"I consider it urgently necessary to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe and Anafarta
Sagir at the earliest possible moment, and I have ordered de Lisle to
make the attempt at the earliest opportunity. I have also ordered
Birdwood to make a fresh attack on Hill 305 as soon as troops are
reorganized and the difficulties of water supply solved, but for this he
will require drafts and fresh troops. I have great hopes that these
attacks may yet be successful, but it is impossible to disguise the fact
that owing to the failure of the IXth Corps to take advantage of
opportunities and the fact that surprise may now be absent, and that the
enemy is prepared and in much greater strength, my difficulties are
enormously increased. In any case my cadres will be so depleted as a
result of action that I shall need large reinforc