canal, I should like to point out, barely get two nights in bed per
week."
"I have been asked by Hamilton to send him a double Company of Patiala
Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs. I can do this, and if you concur I
think it is a better arrangement than to send him the 51st and 53rd
Sikhs."
The Sikhs meant for Gallipoli are gone; we shall never see them more;
they mount guard by night against the ghosts of the Suez Canal.
Another thing; a Correspondent writes in and tells us that for the
honour of his profession he feels bound to let us know that Mr.
Ashmead-Bartlett has secretly sent home an uncensored despatch _per_, of
all people in the world, Mr. Murdoch!
I had begun to wonder what had come over Mr. Murdoch and now it seems he
has come over me!
The next paper on the table was my draft cable of advice for M.
Millerand. Joffre wants his four Divisions to land on the Peninsula;
Sarrail wishes them to work along the Asiatic side. No doubt the views
of the French Generals are being coloured by their wish to stand as
clear as they can of British command. So I have been careful to sweep
away _that_ obstacle by offering to stand down. Now they can fix up the
problem on its merits:--
* * * * *
"Closest consideration has been given to your No. 7843, cipher. Until
now I have consistently opposed a landing on the Asiatic side of the
Straits with less than 6 divisions--see my telegram No. M.F. 349 of 19th
June. On Gallipoli Peninsula area and difficulties of supply limited
liabilities of the opposing forces whereas mainland of Asia gave scope
for the deployment of large forces by the enemy. Now, however, the
situation is clearing up and there has been a great change in the
conditions.
"The Turks had formerly 10,000 to 12,000 men on Asiatic shore with large
reserves on the Peninsula available to cross over there if necessary.
Now Anatolia and Syria have been drained of troops to oppose us on the
Peninsula where the Turks have far longer front to hold, namely, 9-1/2
miles instead of 2-1/2, whilst our position and strength at Suvla and
Anzac are more threatening to their communications than was our position
at Anzac in June. If, therefore, we can be strong enough to maintain
pressure on whole Turkish line on the Peninsula it is unlikely that
Turks could detach troops to oppose French landing on Asiatic shore.
Assuming even that the Turks were enabled to release every soldier from
Th
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