illery. Therefore, I could
not hurriedly evacuate the Bay without sacrificing the majority of
supplies and warlike stores. I might also have very considerable losses,
for the Turks, who were previously 700 yards away, are now within
bombing distance in places. They have a large number of guns in the
northern zone and a retirement could only be effected under heavy fire,
which with unseasoned troops would make the retreat a hazardous one. As
explained in my No. M.F. 664 evacuation of the Bay would involve with it
the _eventual_ evacuation of all but the original Anzac position. But
even if this last step were not necessary the withdrawal of British
soldiers from Suvla would be an overwhelming victory for the Turks. Our
position in the Dardanelles would be entirely altered for the worse and
even the effect of our landing of troops at Salonika might be discounted
in Bulgarian eyes. At the present moment the Turkish commissariat
difficulties and tales of starving families which the wounded bring back
from Constantinople are having a bad effect on their _moral_ and the
number of desertions is on the increase. Two Turkish attempts at the
offensive have broken down completely during the last week as their
troops refused to leave cover. If I give ground the Turkish _moral_ will
immediately recover and instead of containing over 60,000 Turks in the
Northern Zone there would be large numbers set free to go elsewhere. All
these arguments seem to prove plainly that to evacuate a yard of Suvla
would be a most serious, and might prove a disastrous step. I would
therefore prefer to run the risk of holding the line defensively with
fewer troops in order to spare two divisions for the new enterprise.

"I have at present one division in Corps Reserve at Suvla and the 1st
Australian Division resting at Mudros and also one brigade resting at
Imbros. By bringing the tired Australians back and making them replace
the Mounted Division in the section north of Susak Kuyu I could spare
Xth and LIIIrd Divisions or else Xth and XIth. I could also spare one
French brigade from Cape Helles without replacing it by troops from
Suvla, and a total of 4-1/2 British Field Artillery brigades. This would
at any rate enable me to postpone any evacuation at Suvla and if the
withdrawal became necessary later on there would be less loss involved
in supplies and stores, as I could gradually make necessary preparations
for this deplorable contingency.

"The 15-i