llies to send a force to Salonika in order to enable her to support
Serbia should the latter be attacked by Bulgaria, as well as by German
forces from the North. No doubt you realize that if by such action
Bulgaria joins hands with the Central Powers they will have a clear road
to Constantinople and Gallipoli, and be able to send large quantities
of ammunition or troops, rendering your position very hazardous.
"Both France and ourselves have promised to send between us the troops
asked for, viz., 150,000 men, and urgency is essential. It is evident
that under these circumstances some troops will have to be taken from
the Dardanelles to go to Salonika, but it must be clearly understood
that there is no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula or of
giving up the Dardanelles operations until the Turks are defeated. Your
staff officer has suggested to me that you saw no difficulty in reducing
the length of your line and concentrating your forces by withdrawing
from the position now held around Suvla Bay to the neighbourhood of the
Kaiajik Aghala position whence a line might be drawn to the sea.
"Before the situation was changed by the Bulgarians' action we
considered that, owing to the marshy nature of the country now occupied
at Suvla and the approaching winter, this reduction of front would be
strategically advantageous. Hence my telegram No. 8162 to which your No.
M.F. 664 replies.
"An offensive along practically the whole line in France has now
commenced. The infantry are attacking to-day. Far-reaching results are
anticipated which, if secured, should greatly affect your situation.
"The projected dispatch of reinforcements of French and British
divisions for Asiatic operations must be in abeyance until a decision
in the Western theatre can be reached. The troops now at the Dardanelles
which are required for Salonika would be two divisions, preferably the
Xth and XIth. The French would also have to withdraw either a brigade or
a division from their force at Helles for the same purpose. The Yeomanry
now _en route_ to you would also have to be diverted to Salonika and we
should have to arrange to mount them from Egypt after their arrival.
"Cable me at once your ideas as to meeting these requirements. The
Dardanelles Committee consider a withdrawal from Suvla to be advisable
under the circumstances, but they had not seen your telegram No. 664. We
have been asked to send the 15-inch howitzer, now on board ship at
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