,000 in
all. This renewed failure combined with the heavy total casualties since
6th August, and the fact that sickness has been greatly on the increase
during the last fortnight has profoundly modified my position, and as
you cannot now give me further reinforcements it is only possible for me
to remain on the defensive. Naturally, I shall keep on trying to harry
the Turks by local attacks and thus keep alive the offensive spirit but
it must be stated plainly that no decisive success is to be looked for
until such time as reinforcements can be sent.

"The total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000,
and my total force is now only 85,000, of which the fighting strength is
68,000. The French fighting strength is about 15,000. Sick casualties
are becoming abnormal chiefly owing to troops other than late arrivals
being worn out with hardship and incessant shell fire, from which even
when in reserve they are never free. Where Anzac evacuated 100 a day
they are now evacuating 500, where Royal Naval Division evacuated 10
they are now evacuating 60. The result is that I have only some 50,000
men in the North to hold a line from the right of Anzac to the sea
North-east of Suvla, a distance of 23,000 yards.

"When there is no serious engagement, but only daily trench fighting,
the average net wastage from sickness and war is 24 per cent. of
fighting strength per month. The Anzac Corps, the XXIXth Division and
the XLIInd Division are very tired and need a rest badly. Keeping these
conditions in view, it appears inevitable that within the next fortnight
I shall be compelled to relinquish either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and
must also envisage the possibility of a still further reduction of my
front in the near future. Taking the first question of abandoning Anzac
Cove and closing to the North, Suvla Bay is now netted and comparatively
secure from torpedo attack. Further, it offers certain facilities for
disembarkation in winter gales. It has, therefore, some decided
advantages but though I should be able to hold it safely at present, it
would present no facilities for further contraction of my line to meet
the future wastage of my force. On the other hand, by retiring South of
Suvla I could first hold a line Lala Baba--Yilghin Burnu--Kaiajik
Aghala, and then, when normal wastage diminished my strength below this
limit I could, if necessary, withdraw into the original Anzac position.
For these reasons it must