own the drift of hundreds of cables and letters.
_13th August, 1915. Imbros._ Well, I must put it down. Worked till
lunch. In the afternoon, left in H.M.S. _Arno_ and sailed over to Suvla
to have a last look over the _band-o-bast_ for to-morrow's twice
to-morrowed effort. First, saw the Admiral and Commodore who are simply
dancing with impatience. No wonder. Whether or no Kavak Tepe summit
gives a useful outlook on to the back of Sari Bair and the Dardanelles,
at least it will give us the whip hand of the guns on the Anafarta ridge
and save our ships from the annoying attentions they are beginning to
receive. The sailors think too they have worked out an extra good scheme
for ship and shore guns.
Stopford then came aboard; in the mood he was in aboard the _Jonquil_ on
the 8th,--only more so! The Divisional Generals are without hope, that
is the text of his sermon. Hopeless about to-night, or to-morrow, that
is to say; for there are rosy visions and to spare for next week, or the
week after, or any other time, so long as it is not too near us. There
is something in this beats me. We are alive--we are quite all right--the
Brigade of the LIVth sent on to Kuchuk Anafarta Ova made good its point.
True, one battalion got separated from its comrades in the forest and
was badly cut up by Turkish snipers just as was Braddock's force by the
Redskins, but this, though tragic, is but a tiny incident of a great
modern battle and the rest of the 163rd Brigade have not suffered and
hold the spot whence, it was settled, the attack on Kavak Tepe should
jump off. Nothing practical or tactical seems to have occurred to force
us to drop our plan.
But no; Stopford and Reed count the LIIIrd Division as finished: the
LIVth incapable of attack; the rest of the IXth Corps immovable.
If I accept; we have lost this battle. We are not beaten now--the men
are not--but if I accept, we are held up.
There is no way out. Whether there is any good looking back even for one
moment, God knows; I doubt it! But I feel so acutely, I seem to see so
clearly, where our push for Constantinople first began to quit the
rails, that I must put it down right here. The moment was when I asked
for Rawlinson or Byng, and when, in reply, the keen, the young, the fit,
the up-to-date Commanders were all barred, simply and solely that Mahon
should not be disturbed in his Divisional Command. I resisted it very
strongly: I went so far as to remind K. in my cable of h
|