n from favoured institutions or men who had
served as clerks in the boards, might be put on the roster for
substantive appointment. The necessities of the Chinese government
also from time to time compelled it to throw open a still wider door
of entry into the civil service, namely, admission by purchase. During
the T'aip'ing rebellion, when the government was at its wits' end for
money, formal sanction was given to what had previously been only
intermittently resorted to, and since then immense sums of money have
been received by the sale of patents of rank, to secure either
admission to office or more rapid promotion of those already employed.
As a result of this policy, the country has been saddled with
thousands of titular officials far in excess of the number of
appointments to be given away. Deserving men were kept waiting for
years, while inferior and less capable officials were pushed ahead,
because they had money wherewith to bribe their way. Nevertheless the
purchase system admitted into the service a number of men free from
that bigoted adherence to Confucian doctrine which characterizes the
literary classes, and more in touch with modern progress.

All candidates who succeed in entering the official ranks are eligible
for active employment, but as the number of candidates is far in
excess of the number of appointments a period of weary waiting ensues.
A few of the best scholars get admitted at once into the Hanlin
college or into one or other of the boards at Peking. The rest are
drafted off in batches to the various provinces to await their turn
for appointment as vacancies occur. During this period of waiting they
are termed "expectants" and draw no regular pay. Occasional service,
however, falls in their way, as when they are commissioned for special
duty in outlying districts, which they perform as _Wei yuens_, or
deputies of the regular officials. The period of expectancy may be
abridged by recommendation or purchase, and it is generally supposed
that this last lever must invariably be resorted to to secure any
lucrative local appointment. A poor but promising official is often,
it is said, financed by a syndicate of relations and friends, who look
to recoup themselves out of the customary perquisites which attach to
the post. Appointments to the junior provincial posts are usually left
to the provincial government, but the central gov