elirium seizes us, that fears and
terrors assail us." "We know that pleasure and joy on the one hand and
pain and grief on the other are referable to the brain. It is in virtue
of it that we think, understand, see, hear, know ugliness and beauty,
evil and good, the agreeable and the disagreeable." Similarly and more
precisely Descartes indicated the brain, and the brain alone, as the
seat of consciousness. Finally, it was Flourens who perhaps first
definitely insisted on the restriction of the seat of consciousness in
higher animals to that part of the brain which is the fore-brain. A
functional distinction between the fore-brain and the remainder of the
nervous system seems, in fact, that consciousness and physical reactions
are adjunct to the fore-brain in a way in which they are not to the rest
of the system. After transection of the spinal cord, or of the brain
behind the fore-brain, psychical phenomena do not belong to the
reactions of the nervous arcs posterior to the transection, whereas they
do still accompany reactions of the nervous arcs in front and still
connected with the fore-brain. A man after severance of the spinal cord
does not possess in the strict sense consciousness of the limbs whose
afferent nerves lie behind the place of spinal severance. He can see
them with his eyes, and if the severance lie between the arms and the
legs, can feel the latter with his hands. He knows them to be a part of
his body. But they are detached from his consciousness. Sensations
derived from them through all other channels of sense than their own do
not suffice to restore them in any adequate measure to his
consciousness. He must have the sensations so called "resident" in them,
that is, referred to them, without need of any logical inference. These
can be yielded only by the receptive organs resident in the part itself,
its skin, its joints, its muscles, &c., and can only be yielded by those
receptive organs so long as the nerve impulses from them have access to
the fore-brain. Consciousness, therefore, does not seem to attach to any
portion of the nervous system of higher animals from which the
fore-brain has been cut off. In the dog it has been found that no sign
of memory, let alone intelligence, has been forthcoming after removal of
the greater part of the fore-brain.

In lower vertebrates it is not clear that consciousness in primitive
form requires always the co-operation of the fore-brain. In them the
fore-brain