rmies and generals--marvels which usually get repeated and
magnified to most preposterous dimensions by the _embustero_ retailers of
such intelligence. We would also warn him against indulging in such
enthusiasm as he displays in speaking of General Leon--a very fine fellow
undoubtedly, a good soldier and dashing officer, but yet a little
overrated in these lines. "In his unexaggerated feats of war, he eclipsed
the Homeric heroes, and rivalled the incredible exploits of Charlemagne
and his peers. His tremendous lance spread terror and dismay among the
enemies of his queen and country, and the glorious inequalities of Crecy
and Azincour were revived in the deeds of Leon, witnessed by living men."
Revived and considerably eclipsed, we should say, judging from the list of
exploits that follows. If our friend the English resident be in any degree
acquainted with military matters, he must be aware that the dispersal of
an army of eleven thousand infantry, and one thousand horse, by a hundred
and fifty hussars, a feat which he attributes to Leon, is an absurdity;
and that if such a thing, or any thing like it, did occur, it must have
been when the hundred and fifty dragoons were closely backed by some much
more numerous force.

The Spanish army, as it existed at the close of the Carlist war, was
perhaps in a higher state of discipline and practical usefulness than it
had been at any previous period of the present century. Rendered hardy and
martial by six years' unremitting warfare; officered, too, for the most
part, by men who had something besides title or family interest to
recommend them, it only required greater regularity of pay and supplies to
prove highly efficient. Gradually reduced by Espartero to about fifty
thousand men, its numbers were doubled by a decree of Narvaez, who felt
that so small a force was insufficient to support him in his tyrannical
rule. At the same time an unprecedented system of conciliation, or of
adulation it should rather be said, was adopted by the dictator towards
his legions. Espartero had done all in his power, and that the disordered
state of Spanish finances allowed him to do, for the comfort and
well-being of his army; but he had not thought fit to sacrifice to it all
or any other classes of the state. It had not been necessary for him to
do so; _his_ government was not based upon fear, nor dependent on
bayonets. With Narvaez it was very different. His sole tenure of power was
in the fi