specially part III. Bertin: La campagne de 1812 d'apres des
temoins oculaires. Mosbach: Der Uebergang ueber die Beresina
aus ungedruckten Denkw. d. polnischen Obersten Bialkowski,
Streffleur's "Oesterr. militaer. Zeitschrift," 1875.
Clausewitz: "Ueber die Schlacht a.d. Beresina," letter to
Stein, published in the "Hist. Zeitschrift" for 1888. George:
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. Fabry: Campagne de
Russie,1812, Operations Militaires.]

The Reasons for Napoleon's Advance -- The Importance of Moscow --
The Burning of the City -- The French Occupation -- The Military
Situation -- Alexander's Steadfastness -- Napoleon's Impatience
-- The Strategic Problem -- The Exaggeration of the Factors --
The Plan of Retreat -- Malojaroslavetz -- Napoleon's Vacillation.

Some insight into the state of Napoleon's mind may be secured by
contemplating his conduct during and after the battle of Borodino.
That conflict was, on the whole, the bloodiest and most fiercely
contested of all so far fought by him. The French losses were computed
by the Emperor at twenty thousand men, those of the Russians were not
less than double the number. Yet the day was not decisive. Napoleon,
suffering from a severe cold and loss of voice, displayed an unwonted
lassitude. Setting a high value on his personal safety, he did not
intervene at crucial moments, as he was wont to do and as he asserted
was essential in the new science of war, for the purpose of
electrifying officers and men. His scheme of rolling up Kutusoff's
line by a double attack on left and center consequently failed, in
the opinion of the greatest experts, because he did not throw in the
guard on the center at the decisive moment. This failure was due to a
disregard of his own maxim that "generals who save troops for the next
day are always beaten"; not divining a complete cessation of
hostilities by Kutusoff, he thought his reserve might be required on
the morrow. It seems, too, as if he were gradually becoming aware of
the dangers attendant on the prolongation of his base to Moscow. At
Mozhaisk he halted three days, doubtless with the hope that Alexander
would open negotiations to prevent the sack of his sacred capital.
During this pause careful orders were issued for the concentration of
a strong French reserve at Smolensk. Victor was summoned to bring in
his thirty thousand men from the Niemen so a