ia coveted his kingdom; in fact, the Czar
was currently and correctly reported to have said that Saxony was
better suited than Poland to round out Frederick William's dominions.
Dresden welcomed the Russian and Prussian sovereigns because the
citizens were smarting under the trials of military occupation. But
when the King turned to Austria, and marching with his cavalry to
Ratisbon virtually put his army at Metternich's disposal, the Saxons
in general supported him. On April twentieth was signed a secret
agreement between Saxony and Austria whereby the former in return for
thirty thousand troops secured the integrity of her dominions. This
was a triumph for the Austrian minister, but not the only one, because
European diplomacy in general soon joined hands with the national
uprisings. Napoleon, determining too late on the dismemberment of
Prussia, made a last attempt to win back his old comrade in arms, and
in February offered Bernadotte not merely Pomerania, but the lands
between the Elbe and the Weser. But the crafty Gascon had studied the
Prussian movement, and, putting aside the rather indefinite promises
of Napoleon, preferred to join the coalition for the safer, easier
prize of Norway. Great Britain abandoned her scheme for a Hanover
expanded to stretch from the Scheldt to the Elbe, and, subsidizing
both Sweden and Prussia, cemented the new coalition. This was a return
to Pitt's policy of restoring the old balance of power in the old
Europe. Bernadotte, promising thirty thousand men, transported twelve
thousand across to Germany, and joined Buelow to cover Berlin. This
force soon became the Russian right. Kutusoff died in April, and
Barclay was ultimately restored to the chief command, having Bluecher
and a second Prussian army as part of the Russian center. Metternich
saw that the coalition did not intend to conclude such a peace as
would leave Napoleon the preponderance in Europe; to secure any peace
at all he would be compelled, as Talleyrand said, to become king of
France. Accordingly a new turn was quickly given to Austrian
diplomacy, and the French emperor's definite offer of Silesia for a
hundred thousand men was rejected. With the thirty thousand which
Saxony had put at his disposal, and with such an army as Austria
herself could raise, the minister felt sure that at some critical
moment she would be able, as a well-armed mediator, to command a peace
in terms restoring to his country the prestige of immemo