highest welfare in
supporting the Napoleonic system. And what was his conduct? A complete
and sudden reversal of his previous behavior, personal insolence, and
public scorn. Then and there he demanded the suspension, at least
temporarily, of the treaty of alliance between Austria and France--a
paper solemnly negotiated by himself but little more than one short year
earlier; then, too, he demanded a further prolongation of the armistice
while the peace congress held its sessions, and, coldly throwing every
other consideration to the winds, gave his victim to understand that
Austria was no longer a mediator, but an armed arbiter, determined to
regain her glory by the line of least resistance--that is, by alliance
with Russia, in order to secure a continental peace, to which Great
Britain should not be a party.

Is it wonderful that under such provocation Napoleon's hot Corsican
blood boiled over, or that his unruly tongue uttered startling
language? The time had come when he must recognize masters and laws,
and it was not easy. At thirty, as he liked to boast, he had gained
victories, appeased a popular storm, fused parties, and rallied a
nation. Further, for years he had made sport of European dynasties,
and in particular had found that of Austria both double-faced and
time-serving. Having taken a leaf from her book, he had become her
dupe, and it was hard to bear the consequences. The stormy side of the
famous interview is therefore unimportant historically; its only
significance is that it marks the last stage in the evolution of
Austrian diplomacy. Being now strong enough to reassert equality with
France in the councils of Europe, the Hapsburg empire was about to
act. Metternich believed that Alexander's aid would be more valuable
than Napoleon's, and in a letter to his master, written two days
after the famous interview, he explained that through a continental
peace lay the line of least resistance. The arrangement he suggested
to Napoleon would leave England and France to renew the struggle and
fight until exhausted, while Austria, Russia, and Prussia were
recuperating. Napoleon's one weapon against England was his
Continental System; on the morrow of a victorious campaign he could
not so easily throw it down. If there was to be a continental peace,
and not a general one, it must be made after a final decisive victory;
and to assemble his troops for a grand battle with Austria, Russia,
and Prussia, he needed time.