rial empire.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY[48]

[Footnote 48: References: Fain: Manuscrit de l'an 1813.
Mueffling: Aus meinem Leben. Bade: Napoleon im Jahre 1813.
Schimpf: 1813; Napoleon in Sachsen. Foucart: Bautzen une
bataille de deux jours. Metternich's Memoirs, Memoirs of
Hardenberg.]

Napoleon Over-hasty -- Weakness of his Army -- The Low Condition
of the Allies -- Napoleon's Plan Thwarted -- The First Meeting a
Surprise -- The Battle of Luetzen -- An Ordinary Victory -- The
Mediation of Austria -- Napoleon's Effort to Approach Russia --
The Battle of Bautzen -- Death of Duroc -- Napoleon's Greatest
Blunder.

The grim determination of Napoleon to rule or ruin can be read in his
conduct at this time. This might almost be called foolhardy, inasmuch
as when he arrived at Mainz, on April seventeenth, he knew little or
nothing of the enemy's position, force, or plans. Desirous of
anticipating his foe in opening the campaign, he spent a week of
fruitless endeavor at that place, and then started for Erfurt to
obtain a nearer view. The general aspect of his soldiers was not
reassuring, for the young recruits were still raw and the immaturity
of his preparations was evident in a lack of trained horses and
riders. He had stolen three weeks from the enemy, but he had robbed
himself of all that his indefatigable energy might have accomplished
in that time. His recklessness in diplomacy, his refusal of all
concessions, and his exaggerated cleverness in anticipating his
opponents were to prove his undoing from the military point of view.
The other elements of his failure were the political factor already
mentioned.

At the first appearance of Tettenborn's Cossacks, Hamburg rose and
drove out the French, remaining in possession of the allies until the
end of May; but the trusty French garrisons in Dantzic, Stettin,
Kuestrin, Glogau, Modlin, and Zamosc, having been reinforced by Eugene,
held their respective strongholds, and were left to do so. The absence
of these much-needed veterans was the first element of weakness in
Napoleon's army. A second was the insufficiency of real cavalry, brave
as had been the parade of horses in France. It was the great captain's
firm conviction, repeatedly and emphatically expressed, that without
active cavalry, armed with long-range guns, offensive warfare was not
possible. This defect he ha