autumn of 1812 was mild, the winter late in opening.
Neither cheerless steppes, nor phenomenal cold, nor unheard-of snows,
nor any reversal of nature's laws,--not even the motley nationalities
of the grand army, or an unhistoric migration from south to
north,--none of these was the chief cause of failure, which is to be
found in the attempt monstrously to exaggerate the factors of a
strategic system evolved for national, but not for continental,
proportions.

The first and natural thought of a direct retreat to Smolensk was
momentarily entertained; but it had to be abandoned because, with weak
flanks and a bare country, the distance was too far. The same was true
in regard to the move toward St. Petersburg--the distance was too
great for the conditions. The circuit toward Kaluga was first
considered as a feint to throw the Russians off the scent; it became a
necessity when they assumed the offensive in the unforeseen and
unexpected attack on Murat. The Emperor did not dare to expose his
flank and rear to an advancing foe, and accordingly his army was
assembled on the road toward Kaluga. Should he advance or await a
further movement of the enemy? Evidently the former, otherwise the
entire moral effect of the first offensive would be lost. A long march
had to be extended still farther, partly for strategic reasons, but
chiefly in order to secure an additional advantage of the first
importance; to wit, sustenance from the country when the distances
were too great for the workings of any feasible commissariat
department. If the Russians should even momentarily be deceived into
believing that the French had resumed the offensive, a line from
Kaluga direct to Smolensk would still be open for retreat while the
enemy was preparing for action.

The report was spread in Moscow that Napoleon was going out to
overwhelm Kutusoff and then return. Mortier, with eight thousand of
the young guard, remained behind, his orders being to blow up the
Kremlin before leaving. The main army advanced across the river Pachra
and moved toward the Lusha. There was as yet no word of the enemy;
possibly he had been misled and was advancing directly on Moscow.
Napoleon, therefore, turned westward in the hope that he might reach
Kaluga without opposition. On the twenty-fourth the Russian van
appeared. Had Kutusoff acted on his correct information and thrown
forward his whole army, a decisive battle might have ended the
invasion. As it was, Eugene,