of interpretation,
to refer to the use of the same phrase in other parts of the same
instrument, for the purpose of discovering the sense attached to it by
those who used it. Applying this rule, we find in the article concerning
the duties and powers of the president, (3d section) that "he shall,
from time to time, give to the congress information of the state of the
Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge _necessary and_ expedient." It is by virtue of this power thus
granted, and of this alone, that the president has recommended the
creation of a new bank to the legislature. Now, it will not be pretended
that he could have judged this recommendation to be _necessary_, in the
strictest sense of the term, but at most, that it was highly useful and
important. It must then be admitted, either that the narrow
interpretation of the word "necessary," relied on by those who deny the
constitutionality of the bank, is erroneous, or that the president
himself has violated the constitution in the recommendation he has made.
If it be insisted, that he had the constitutional right to recommend a
measure, which both houses of congress had pronounced highly
inexpedient, because he believed it prudent, and politic, and
salutary--the ground on which he himself places it--then the same
liberal interpretation of the term "necessary," which we admit to be the
true one, will make the bank constitutional. We have resorted to this
rule, not so much because it furnishes an argument _ad hominem_ which is
irresistible, as for the higher purpose of throwing light on one of the
most controverted parts of the constitution.

But admitting, for the sake of argument, the constitutionality of the
bank to be one of those difficult and complicated questions about which
men's minds may always be divided, and that there are reasons on either
side, sufficient, if not to convince, to perplex and bewilder, and to
afford pretexts for those who seek some sinister or selfish ends--and of
such character are most constitutional questions--we would ask, if this
is never to have a termination? Are questions of this kind to be always
unsettled, so that no length of time, however sufficient to quiet
private controversies, shall put an end to those which most nearly
concern the tranquillity and permanence of the Union?

On this subject of constitutional questions generally, we would trespass
awhile on the patience of our readers. I