officers, each with his
appropriate duty--as--one or more to keep accounts--another to receive
money--another to pay it away--another to be its general depositary--and
that they are all placed under the superintendence of a president, whose
character and station in society give assurance for the faithful
discharge of his duty. That there is, moreover, a board of directors,
who hold their offices only for a year, and who, once a month or
oftener, appoint a committee to examine the affairs of the bank, and
especially to ascertain whether the amount of notes, securities, and
specie, correspond with the accounts of the institution. Yet, with all
these safeguards, it is found, now and then, that men who had previously
been above all suspicion, have not been able to withstand the temptation
to use the money thus placed in their charge, and that, occasionally,
these frauds and peculations are practised a long time without
detection. If this is the case, when there is such strict
accountability, and unremitted vigilance, how would it be when there was
neither, and when those who received the public money, instead of being
compelled to deposit it in a bank, as soon as they received it, and to
check for it when they paid it over, might use it as they pleased,
provided they were always ready to meet the drafts of the government. At
many places they might do this, and yet, in consequence of the large sum
which is always lying idle, or rather unappropriated in the treasury,
they might have the use of the excess, to a considerable amount, as long
as they remained in office. For several years the amount in the treasury
has never been less than five millions, and sometimes considerably more;
and of this, according to the ordinary current of business, one-third or
upwards would commonly be in the city of New-York, if it were not
transferred to Washington; and this money, which is now invigorating
industry and trade, it is proposed to consign either to utter idleness,
or to the exclusive use of the officers of the treasury. In addition to
that aversion to change which is felt by all office-holders, this plan
might furnish them with no ordinary means of effecting their object.

But if for the sake of guarding against such strong temptation to
speculate with the public funds, and against such an encouragement to
corruption, by affording materials for it, the public money were
required, as now, to be deposited in the banks; though that plan