we believe that none of these things go very far at
bank. The object of its directors being to make money, they prefer the
paper of a rich man they hate, to that of a poor friend. Nor do they
widely differ from the rest of the world in this particular. But
granting that moral and political considerations do influence the bank
in its loans, who does not see that they could have no effect, except
when the supply of money for loan was not equal to the demand, and that
the mischief would be increased by putting down the richest and most
substantial bank in the country?

Upon the whole, this cry against the influence of the bank, resolves
itself into that of wealth and property. These do exert a certain
influence in the community on some occasions, and it is more than
counteracted on others, by the jealousy and ill will it engenders.
Whatever influence wealth may have, it is inseparable from our present
condition, as we presume the United States are not yet prepared for the
Agrarian system, and every man will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of
his own industry, or that of his ancestors; but be it little or much, we
cannot reasonably expect to see it exerted more harmlessly or more
beneficially than in a solid, well managed bank. If, however, in spite
of all these considerations, the power of these institutions be thought
too great, and too liable to abuse, then there is no more effectual way
of weakening it than by diffusion. As most of the state banks are more
or less under the control of the state authorities, who may use the
influence of these banks for political purposes, it must be desirable to
all those who wish the public mind as free and unbiassed as possible, to
see this influence weakened, if not neutralized; and there seems no more
effectual mode of doing this than establishing a rival bank, over which
the state politicians could exercise no sort of authority. Let us, for
example, suppose that a system of banking was adopted for a state, by
which, under the colour of guarding the public against their insolvency,
those institutions were subjected to a _surveillance_ and control which
were calculated to make them feel their dependence on the state
government, and when the plan was matured, to make them obsequious to
its will. Would not every friend to the political purity of the state,
and the independent spirit of its citizens, wish to see a scheme of this
character frustrated? and what means so conducive to this e