But by an influence which is supposed to be so "formidable," is meant,
perhaps, a political and corrupt influence. If there be such a one, it
must be seen and felt; and we would ask in what way does it exert
itself? Does the bank use its money in the elections? If so, its
accounts must show it; and as there are men of all parties who own, or
may own, shares in the stock, let those who suspect this abuse
scrutinize those accounts for the purpose of detecting it. But those who
manage the banks, know very well, and so do those who accuse them, that
nine-tenths, or rather ninety-nine hundredths of the stockholders, would
not have given a five dollar note to get the president elected, or to
get him turned out. Your office-seekers, indeed, might pay pretty
liberally for such service, but they are seldom stockholders. These are,
for the most part, thrifty, cautious men, who choose to vest their money
in some fund which gives them regular returns; and they are content that
they shall be small, provided they be certain. The rest are widows,
guardians of orphan children, trustees of public institutions, and
merchants who have more capital than they can safely and profitably
employ. Now, who of these would allow a president and directors to
squander their money in a matter in which they felt little interest, and
that probably a divided one. No body believes this, and yet it is not
easy to say in what other mode they could exercise a corrupt influence.

But if the stockholders were disposed to spend their money in
electioneering, can they be prevented from acting so foolishly by
putting down the bank? If the charter is not renewed, their money will
be returned to them, and they would then have both the power and the
inducement to use it for political purposes, which they cannot have
while it is supplying a currency to the country, and invigorating its
industry and commerce. But, in truth, it is well known, that those
persons do not make ducks and drakes of their money now, and are not
likely to do it then.

It is true, that in case of an extraordinary demand for money, beyond
the means of supply by the state banks, the Bank of the United States
may sometimes prefer discounting the note of one man to that of
another--the paper of A to that of B; and that some of the directors
might have given the preference to A, because he was a neighbour--others
by his being a friend or relative, and others again by mere party
sympathies. But