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torm, if it carry less sail in proportion to its ballast. We do not mean to deny, that a bank with a superior capital, if it were disposed to injure a rival at all hazards, might prove an inconvenient neighbour, and greatly curtail its business. If it were to put itself to the trouble of procuring the paper of the other, as soon as it was issued, and convert it immediately into specie, the loans of that other might be restricted to the amount of its specie capital. But this could not be effected without a degree of trouble and expense which would make it impracticable. What means does such a bank possess of drawing in the paper of the other bank, except so far as the debtors of the one institution chance to be the debtors of the other, or it choose to give a premium for the notes of its rival? It is not likely, that the same individuals would be the debtors to both banks, to a great extent; and as to a premium, such sacrifices seldom take place in individual competition, much less in that of banks. Besides, as soon as the bank which was thus assailed found that a premium was given for its paper, it would issue notes for the purpose of obtaining it, and the faster its notes were bought up and returned for specie, the more would be found in the market--a new swarm being attracted by the premium as soon as the first disappeared--until in a few months its hostile rival would share the fate of those who attempt to break another sort of banks--its own coffers would be exhausted. The means then which a bank possesses of narrowing the sphere of circulation of a rival's paper, are much more limited than is commonly imagined; and such as they are, it will be cautious of exerting, lest the same game should be played on itself. A combination of the state banks, or even a single one of respectable capital, may practise the same means of annoyance against a Bank of the United States, as that could put in operation against them. But if both parties were wise, or rather not utterly foolish, they would each pursue their own business; and one not otherwise interfere with the other, than by occasionally exchanging notes, and receiving the difference in specie. This course might indeed prove a check to extravagant issues by either, but it is precisely that check which the public is interested in maintaining. There is a further security against the wanton and bootless mischief which fear or design has imputed to the Bank of the United
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