evenues of the Crown were sufficient, but were for extraordinary
occasions, as to pay the King's debts, or to conduct foreign
wars.

"Third. That when the hereditary revenues of the Crown,
or those settled on the King for life at the beginning of his
reign, ceased to be sufficient for the maintenance of government
and for public defence, the practice of withholding supplies
ceased.

"Fourth. There has been no instance since the Revolution
of 1688 of attaching general legislation to a bill for raising
or appropriating money, and scarcely, if ever, such an instance
before that date. When such an attempt has been made it has
been resisted, denounced and abandoned, and the English Constitutional
authorities, without exception, are agreed that such a proceeding
is unwarrantable, revolutionary and destructive of the English
Constitution.

"It is true that the luxury or ambition of Kings or their
indulgent bounty to their favorites led them to assemble
Parliament and to ask additional supplies from their subjects.
It is also true that these requests furnished the occasion
to the Commons to stipulate for redress of grievances. But
the grievances so redressed had no relation to the laws of
the Realm. These laws were made or altered by the free assent
of the three estates in whom the law-making power vested by
the Constitution. The grievances of which the Commons sought
redress, whether from Tudor, Plantagenet or Stuart, were the
improper use of prerogatives, the granting of oppressive monopolies,
the waging of costly foreign wars, the misconduct of favorites
and the like. The improvident expenditure of the royal patrimony,
the granting the crown land or pensions to unworthy persons,
is a frequent ground of complaint.

"But there is a broader and simpler distinction between the
two cases. The mistake, the gross, palpable mistake, which
these gentlemen fall into in making this comparison, lies
at the threshold. The House of Commons, in its discretion,
used to grant, and sometimes now grants, supplies to the King.
The American Congress, in its discretion, never grants supplies
to the President under any circumstances whatever. The only
appropriation of the public money to which that term can properly
apply, the provision for the President's compensation, is
by design and of purpose placed wholly out of the power of
Congress. The provision is peremptory that--

"'The President shall, at stated times, receive for