similar
inconvenience); and they brought in Bills for the responsibility of
Ministers. The public attention, however was soon directed from these
internal matters to even more serious questions of foreign policy.

At the beginning of February the Poles had once more risen in revolt
against the Russian Government. Much sympathy was felt for them in
Western Europe. England, France, and Austria joined in representations
and remonstrances to the Czar; they expected that Prussia would join
them.

Nothing could have been more inconvenient to Bismarck; he was at the
time fully occupied in negotiations about German affairs, and he was
probably anxious to bring to a speedy issue the questions between
Prussia and Austria; it was therefore most important to him to be on
good terms with France and England, for he would not challenge Austria
unless he was sure that Austria would have no allies; now he must
quarrel with either Russia or with France. An insurrection in Poland
was, however, a danger to which everything else must be postponed; on
this his opinion never varied, here there could be no compromise. He was
perfectly open: "The Polish question is to us a question of life and
death," he said to Sir Andrew Buchanan. There were two parties among the
Poles; the one, the extreme Republican, wished for the institution of an
independent republic; the other would be content with self-government
and national institutions under the Russian Crown; they were supported
by a considerable party in Russia itself. Either party if successful
would not be content with Russian Poland; they would demand Posen, they
would never rest until they had gained again the coast of the Baltic and
deprived Prussia of her eastern provinces. The danger to Prussia would
be greatest, as Bismarck well knew, if the Poles became reconciled to
the Russians; an independent republic on their eastern frontier would
have been dangerous, but Polish aspirations supported by the Panslavonic
party and the Russian army would have been fatal. Russia and Poland
might be reconciled, Prussia and Poland never can be. Prussia therefore
was obliged to separate itself from the other Powers; instead of sending
remonstrances to the Czar, the King wrote an autograph letter proposing
that the two Governments should take common steps to meet the common
danger; General von Alvensleben, who took the letter, at once concluded
a convention in which it was agreed that Prussian and Russian t