r
nostram fidem et opera. Ac facio hoc certo consilio; non enim volo
conscientias perturbare illis inexplicabilibus labyrinthis_." (_C. R._
2, 547.)

In the third, revised edition of his _Explanation of the Epistle to the
Romans_, 1532, he suggests "that divine compassion is truly the cause of
election, but that there is some cause also in him who accepts, namely,
in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered. _Verecundius est,
quod aliquamdiu placuit Augustino, misericordiam Dei vere causam
electionis esse, sed tamen eatenus aliquam causam in accipiente esse,
quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat, quia malum ex nobis est_."
(Gieseler 3, 2, 192; Seeberg 4, 2, 442.) In an addition to his _Loci_ in
1533, Melanchthon again speaks of a cause of justification and election
residing in man, in order to harmonize the statements that the promise
of the Gospel is both gratis and universal. (_C. R._ 21, 332.) In the
_Loci_ edition of 1543 we read: "God elected because He had decreed to
call us to the knowledge of His Son, and desires His will and benefits
to be known to the human race. He therefore approves and elected those
who obey the call. _Elegit Deus, quia vocare nos ad Filii agnitionem
decrevit et vult generi humano suam voluntatem et sua beneficia
innotescere. Approbat igitur ac elegit obtemperantes vocationi_." (21,
917.)

The bold synergistic views concerning conversion later on developed by
Melanchthon plainly involve the doctrine that there must be in man a
cause of discrimination why some are elected while others are rejected.
In his _Loci_ of 1548 he had written: "Since the promise is universal,
and since there are no contradictory wills in God, some cause of
discrimination must be in us why Saul is rejected and David accepted
(_cur Saul abiiciatur David recipiatur_), that is, there must be some
dissimilar action in these two." (21, 659.) Self-evidently Melanchthon
would not have hesitated to replace the phrase "why Saul was rejected
and David accepted," with "why Saul was rejected and David elected."

Melanchthon held that the sole alternative of and hence the only escape
from, the doctrine of absolute necessity (_Stoica anagke_) and from the
absolute decree, which makes God responsible also for sin and eternal
damnation, was the synergistic assumption of man's "ability to apply
himself to grace--_facultas applicandi se ad gratiam_." Accordingly, as
he dubbed those who opposed his Calvinizing views on