to Another's Power Are Hindered from
Taking Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
from taking vows.

Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
children may make religious profession even without the consent of
their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows,
through being subject to another's power.

Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are
under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.

_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow
any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in
age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the
same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband.
Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's
power cannot bind themselves by vow.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent
of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those
matters wherein he is subject to another.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a
promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to
virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as
stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow
are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power
vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition
that he whose power it conc