ated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3),
there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal
of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less,
and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to
whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as
regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,
2, 3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess,
not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
manner it ought not.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil
things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of
the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus
prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke
16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']
in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way
that superstition is described as religion.

Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For
its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it
is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot
(_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it
hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow
that "superstition" means that from which the word is de