atter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account
of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et
transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But
after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind
themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent
of their parents.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have
not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid,
as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain
an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which
are taken in profession.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]
Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping
it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A
beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall
be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a
worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of
dispensation.
Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially
those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of
God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a
vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine
law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First
Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
dispensation.
Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
which a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can
dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
grant a dispensation from a vow.
_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many
has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its
force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore
it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
_I answer that,_ T
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