cross-examined by Socrates:--
'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness
opposed to one another?'--'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would
rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain
point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way
from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that
everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed
to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore
temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already
admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has
now to be compared with justice.
Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process
to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled
by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just.
He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say,
he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause
of the audience.
Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on
the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore
he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to
accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who
thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he
takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the
two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak
long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak
short?
Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and
then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias
proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he
would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he
will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will
ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant
assent.
Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which
he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,
'Hard is it to become good,'
and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.'
How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem,
is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman
of Simo
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