ys?

Certainly.

And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance?

Clearly.

And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be
the opposite of wisdom?

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes.

Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One
says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is
distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and
that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves
and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two
assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly
not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said
to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not
more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two
opposites--wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What
else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness
appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we
must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man
can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which
nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if
you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you
are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the
argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer
may both be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the
argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that
some men are temperate, and yet unjust?

Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

And temperance is good sense?

Yes.

And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

Granted.

If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?

If they succeed.

And you would admit the existence of goods?

Yes.

And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be
inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

I thought that P