e lead, he said; for you are the author of the
discussion.

May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring
into the health or some other bodily quality of another:--he looks at
his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your
chest and back to me that I may have a better view:--that is the sort of
thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion
is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind
to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may
know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the
world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or
of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge,
and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger,
or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,--just as if knowledge
were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view?
or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which
cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the
difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to
knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I,
above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the
highest of human things.

Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world
are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the
things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most
persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act
contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of
those affections which I was just now mentioning.

Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which
mankind are in error.

Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them
what is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by
pleasure,' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always
do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and
are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and
Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being
overcome by pleasure,' pray, what is it, and by what name would you
describe it?

But why, Socrates, should we trou