be
explained by the known facts of the case. His doctrine had been lately
taught in a book generally read and approved. He was convinced that he
had at least refuted the opposite theories, and yet it was apparently in
behalf of one of these that he was condemned. Whatever errors his book
contained, he might fear that an act of submission would seem to imply
his acceptance of an opinion he heartily believed to be wrong, and would
therefore be an act of treason to truth. The decree conveyed no
conviction to his mind. It is only the utterances of an infallible
authority that men can believe without argument and explanation, and
here was an authority not infallible, giving no reasons, and yet
claiming a submission of the reason. Dr. Frohschammer found himself in a
dilemma. To submit absolutely would either be a virtual acknowledgment
of the infallibility of the authority, or a confession that an
ecclesiastical decision necessarily bound the mind irrespectively of its
truth or justice. In either case he would have contradicted the law of
religion and of the Church. To submit, while retaining his own opinion,
to a disciplinary decree, in order to preserve peace and avoid scandal,
and to make a general acknowledgment that his work contained various
ill-considered and equivocal statements which might bear a bad
construction,--such a conditional submission either would not have been
that which the Roman Court desired and intended, or, if made without
explicit statement of its meaning, would have been in some measure
deceitful and hypocritical. In the first case it would not have been
received, in the second case it could not have been made without loss of
self-respect. Moreover, as the writer was a public professor, bound to
instruct his hearers according to his best knowledge, he could not
change his teaching while his opinion remained unchanged. These
considerations, and not any desire to defy authority, or introduce new
opinions by a process more or less revolutionary, appear to have guided
his conduct. At this period it might have been possible to arrive at an
understanding, or to obtain satisfactory explanations, if the Roman
Court would have told him what points were at issue, what passages in
his book were impugned, and what were the grounds for suspecting them.
If there was on both sides a peaceful and conciliatory spirit, and a
desire to settle the problem, there was certainly a chance of effecting
it by a candid interc
|